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Imperfect information in favour of the central bank or the private sector has strong 
theoretical implications. The empirical literature has then already tried to assess the 
direction of the information asymmetry in the case of the Federal Reserve. Evidence, 
however, is mixed. The objective of this paper is therefore to gain some 
unambiguous outcomes by avoiding biases of methods, data and samples. The 
results are twofold: first, Fed possesses an informational advantage on inflation but 
only on it. There is no evidence of any advantage for private forecasters or Fed on 
real GNP/GDP; second, the longer the horizon, the more pronounced the advantage 
of Fed on inflation. Last, this advantage appears to stem from the specific expertness 
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1. Introduction 
 
Information is quite often the sinew of war. In monetary theory, the hypothesis of perfect 
information makes inefficient discretionary policies1, while recently the introduction, 
generally through New-Keynesian models, of imperfections in the information process either 
on the central bank’s or on the private sector’s side has shown to produce different 
outcomes. Noisy information from policymakers reinforces the argument for commitment 
and policy carefulness. At the opposite, partial information from private agents gives rise to 
different recommendations, from successful discretionary policies to the need for more 
aggressive response to inflation. All in all, the hypothesis of flawed information seems more 
plausible than full information and the existence of imperfect information in favour of one 
actor or the other has strong theoretical implications. 
The empirical literature has then already tried to assess the direction of the information 
asymmetry in the case of the Federal Reserve and US private sector with mainly Peek, 
Rosengren and Tootell (1998, 2003), Joutz and Stekler (2000), Romer and Romer (2000), 
Atkeson and Ohanian (2001), Gavin and Mandal (2001), Sims (2002), Faust, Swanson and 
Wright (2004) and Amornthum (2006). Evidence, however, is mixed.  
 
In contrast to the existing literature, the objective of this paper is to avoid biases of methods, 
data and samples, which may have led to these conflicting conclusions, to gain some clear-
cut results. It therefore consists of use of various methodologies applied previously (Mean 
Square Errors, regressions, a pooling method of forecasts2 and a factor model) on the same 
data and sample, extension of the latter, and use of real-time and final data. Alternative 
measure of inflation is also tested. Because the contribution is to compare methods to 
understand the differences in the existing results, I take into account criticisms made to 
them, attempting thus to close the gap in the literature.  
 
The main findings shed some light on the debate: First, Fed possesses an informational 
advantage on inflation but only on it. There is no evidence of any advantage for private 
forecasters or Fed on real GNP/GDP. Second, the longer the horizon, the more pronounced 
the advantage of Fed on inflation. This tends to confirm the advantage is robust and not due 
to timing advantage and access to information on the short run. These results confirm the 
conclusions of Sims (2002) and some of those of Romer and Romer (2000), while undermine 
the outcomes according to which Fed has no informational advantage. I suggest this 
advantage stems from institutional and inherent aspect of central banking. A parallel result 
arising from the array of methods is that Fed and private forecasters better forecast real-time 
value of real GDP while they both have more accurate predictions of final data of inflation.  
 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 deals with the related literature, 
theoretical as well as empirical. Section 3 describes the data. Section 4 presents the 
methodologies tested and their results. Section 5 discusses the results and the sources of the 
informational advantage. Section 6 concludes this paper. 
 
2. Related Literature 
 
In theory, information has many different implications for monetary policy. In the 
case of the seminal work of Lucas (1972) and Sargent and Wallace (1975, 1976), rational 
expectations suppose perfect information, discretionary policies provide relative price 
                                                 
1 See Lucas (1972), Sargent and Wallace (1975), Barro (1976), Barro and Gordon (1983) and Canzoneri (1985). 
2 Developed by Davies and Lahiri (1995) and Clements, Joutz and Stekler (2007)   4
distortions and then optimal monetary policy is reached by commitment. However, 
imperfect information seems more plausible than the standard assumption of full 
information. Because imperfectly observed policy is equivalent to unanticipated policy, some 
studies noted that monetary policy could have real effects such as Taylor (1980), Meyer and 
Webster (1982), and Cukierman and Meltzer (1986). Empirical evidence has moreover 
established that monetary policy, unanticipated and anticipated (Mishkin, 1982), has real 
effects and virtually all countries established economic stabilization as one of the main goal 
of central banking. 
 
Recently, there has been a growing literature on the implications of imperfect information for 
optimal monetary policy based on the New-Keynesian model. On one hand, information gap 
may be in favour of private agents. Orphanides (2003) find that with noisy information of 
policymakers, excessively activist policy can increase rather than decrease economic 
instability, what leads Aoki (2003) to infer the noise undergone by the central bank justifies a 
degree of policy cautiousness and optimal policy should display interest rate smoothing. 
Svensson and Woodford (2002, 2003) and Swanson (2004) confirm that policymakers should 
exhibit carefulness when observable variables are subject to measurement errors. Moreover, 
Svensson and Woodford (2004) show, assuming the private sector has more information 
than the policymaker, “all representations of optimal policy that would be correct in the case 
of full information continue to be correct under asymmetric partial information”. Aoki (2006) 
makes a similar assumption (precisely the central bank has noisy information and the private 
agents have perfect information) and shows the central bank can improve the trade-off with 
a commitment regime that offset policies errors. They conclude that the information problem 
is a reason for the desirability of commitment. However, Aoki (2006) notes the quantitative 
benefit of commitment is shown to be very small, when these models are calibrated for the 
US economy. 
 
On the other hand, the asymmetry of information might be in favour of the central bank, 
when individual agents have limited capacity for processing information. For instance, 
“allowing individual suppliers’ subjective perceptions of current conditions to be 
contaminated by the noise that inevitably results from finite information-processing 
capacity” leads Woodford (2003) to find it “possible to explain not only real effects of purely 
nominal disturbances, but real effects that may persist for a substantial period of time”. 
There is then an important cost to abstracting from the information limitations of price-
setters. In the Sargent and Wallace (1975) model, successful discretionary policy would be 
only possible if central bank’s information were not available to the public, but the 
interpretation could be inversed, that is “if suppliers have an inaccurate estimate of current 
aggregate conditions (…) because of paying insufficient attention to the available public 
domain data”. In the same vein, Sims (2003) notes that the hypothesis of rational inattention 
fits macroeconomic time series relationships better than rational expectations. Adam (2007) 
shows identically that when firms’ inattentiveness gives rise to idiosyncratic information 
errors and imperfect common knowledge about the shocks hitting the economy, monetary 
policy has strong real effects, making it optimal to stabilize the output gap. Even further, 
Garfinkel and Oh (1995) find, based on a model where the monetary authority's private 
information gives rise to an unavoidable trade-off between flexibility and credibility, noisy 
announcements can serve as a meaningful form of communication to make that trade-off 
more favourable.  
 
At last, the ‘learning’ literature is based on the same hypothesis of limited information 
processing capacity of individuals. In this framework, Evans and Honkapohja (2003) make a 
case for incorporating private forecasts of inflation and output gap into the interest rate rule   5
to reach optimal central bank behaviour under discretion; while Waters (2006) shows that 
the commitment optimum under rational expectations is not optimal under adaptive 
learning. Next, Honkaphoja and Mitra (2005) show in the case of central bank having less 
information about the shocks than the private sector, there is a further learnability constraint 
that must be met by the policymaker that can lead to problems of instability. In contrast, if 
the private sector has less information than the central bank, then no further learnability 
constraint arises as a result of the asymmetric information. They then support the general 
notion that the central bank should spend enough resources in acquiring good information 
about the shocks hitting the economy. In the continuity, Orphanides and Williams (2007) 
examine economy in which private agents and the central bank possess imperfect knowledge 
about the true structure of the economy. Private agents rely on an adaptive learning 
technology and policymakers are uncertain about the economy's natural rates of interest and 
unemployment. They show that the scope for economic stabilization is significantly reduced 
relative to an economy under rational expectations with perfect knowledge. And call for 
more aggressive responses to inflation that would be optimal under perfect knowledge. 
 
There is very little doubt that both private agents and central banks have, in our real world, 
flawed information; the central question is to identify which one has the less imperfect 
information. Thus, many authors have already tried to assess the informational advantage 
between the central bank and the private agents. This issue is commonly assessed in the 
literature through forecasts3. 
 
On one hand, some authors have found evidence of an informational advantage for the 
central banks. Romer and Romer (2000) show the Federal Reserve has private information, 
by comparing the Greenbook4 forecasts to private sector ones on a sample from 1969 to 1991 
and over several horizons. They present evidence that Greenbook inflation forecasts have 
been more accurate than private forecasts, in the sense that the optimal linear combination of 
the private and Greenbook’s forecasts places a weight near to one on the Fed’s forecasts and 
essentially zero weight on the private sector’s. The picture for the output growth forecasts is 
slightly different: Greenbook’s forecasts were better than private sector’s ones, but the 
evidence is weaker though the informational advantage is more pronounced at short 
horizons than for inflation. Gavin and Mandal (2001) compare Federal Open Meeting 
Committee, Blue Chip and Greenbook forecasts. Based on the root mean squared errors, the 
Greenbook forecasts of inflation are more accurate than any other forecasts, while the results 
are more contrasted for output on the 1983-1994 period. They show too that the Blue Chip 
consensus appears to match pretty well the FOMC’s central tendency forecasts. Sims (2002) 
is led up to analyze the performance of the Federal Reserve forecasts and finds first on the 
1979-1995 period, according to their RMSE that the best inflation forecasts are those of the 
Greenbook, and that the difference does not seem large with the MPS model of the Federal 
Reserve (the ancestor of the FRB/US model). He then  carries on his stu dy wit h a factor  
analysis of the forecasts and finds for inflation that the evidence for the superiority of the 
Greenbook over private forecasters is strong.  The advantage on output growth is statistically 
negligible. Based on original data, Peek, Rosengren and Tootell (1998, 2003) find that 
                                                 
3 One must recognize central bank forecasts may not be destitute of policy aspects (as they may be conditional to 
a monetary policy scenario), while private forecasts could respond to incitation for institutions to distance 
themselves from competition. However, the main hypothesis of this work, widespread in the literature, is to 
suppose forecasts made by both the central bank and the private sector map basically all information available to 
them. The fact that the former are released with a 5 years lag and the latter are lucrative goes in this direction. 
4 The Federal Reserve forecasts come from the Greenbook prepared by the staff of the Board of Governors before 
each meeting of the Federal Open Market Committee. These forecasts are made available to the public five years 
after the FOMC meeting they correspond.   6
confidential supervisory information on bank ratings (CAMEL ratings5) significantly 
improves private forecasts of inflation and unemployment rates, thus providing an 
informational advantage to the Federal Reserve. The results are consistent across the 
individual forecasters and for Blue Chip forecasts globally. The contribution of this rating is 
independent too of publicly available leading indicators. Moreover, they show supervisory 
information add significantly to private forecasts made even a full year after the information 
is gathered and released, and then supervisory data provide a persistent informational 
advantage, sufficiently large and persistent according to them to be exploited. 
 
Finally, Amornthum (2006) claims too that the Federal Reserve has a better forecast accuracy 
over the private sector by comparing forecasts at the individual level in opposition to 
consensus forecasts. Its results suggest that the Fed dominates SPF, but not all private 
forecasters and that this advantage decreases with longer horizon.  
One question that arises from this study is whether private forecasts do represent all private 
sector’s information. Private forecasts are generally surveys and are thus made on the base of 
responses of many institutions, banks or firms from various horizons. They then gather 
information from diverse places and are too a source of information for some others agents. 
This point of view seems to be supported by the fact that surveys are good predictors6. I here 
decided to focus on the surveys. Forecasts of one individual institution could be more 
accurate than Fed’s or surveys’ ones at one date, but first, they do certainly not represent 
information of all private agents7 and second, a forecaster that would succeed to consistently 
provide the best forecasts on the market would become known as the reference. Reality 
shows that it does not exist. 
 
On the other hand, Joutz and Stekler (2000) examine the characteristics of Fed’s forecasts 
and compare them to ARIMA models and ASA/NBER surveys. They focus on usual errors 
measures, tests for rationality and features of accuracy of these forecasts. According to their 
analysis, overall the Fed predictions tended to yield the same type of errors that private 
forecasters have displayed. Atkeson and Ohanian (2001) compare inflation forecasts from 
the Greenbook with a naïve model of forecast and find that the RMSE for both “are basically 
the same” and argue then that Greenbook’s forecasts have on average been no better than the 
naive model. However, compared to previous ones, their study covers the years 1984-1996: a 
period of very stable evolution of inflation, what favors a naïve or AR model. Faust, 
Swanson and Wright (2004) concern themselves with the Federal Reserve policy surprises 
and whether they convey some private information. They then conduct two tests of 
hypothesis and find that the Federal Reserve policy surprises could not systematically be 
used to improve forecasts of statistical releases and that forecasts are not systematically 
revised in response to policy surprises. There is thus according to them little evidence that 
Fed’s surprises pass on superior information.  
 
Given the mixed results of the empirical literature, the contribution of this work is thereby to 
eliminate the samples or methods biases to gain some clear-cut conclusions on this 
asymmetry of information.  
 
                                                 
5 For “Capital, Assets, Management, Earnings and Liquidity”. This composite rating evaluates the health of banks 
on these five categories and delivers a score between 1 (sound in every respect) and 5 (high probability of failure, 
severely deficient performance). 
6 Ang, Bekaert and Wei (2005) find that between time-series ARIMA models, regressions using real activity 
measures deducted from the Phillips curve, term structure models and survey based measures, the best method 
of forecasting US inflation out-of-sample is surveys. 
7 See above the literature on information processing limits.   7
3 Data Description 
 
Greenbook forecasts impose themselves spontaneously as the Federal Reserve forecasts. The 
commercial forecasts surveys are used to represent the information hold by the private sector 
or at least markets participants that take place in the monetary game.  
 
3.1 Forecast Data 
Data used are those of the Federal Reserve and the Survey of Professional Forecasters (SPF 
hereafter) and both are made available on the web site of the Federal Reserve Bank of 
Philadelphia8. As a measure of inflation, I use the GDP price deflator (because it has been 
consistently forecasted throughout the entire period by both forecasters, compared to the 
Consumer Price Index for which the definition has changed across time and has started to be 
forecasted later. Robustness tests with CPI are nevertheless performed). As commonly used 
in literature, the real GDP/GNP is the variable considered for the ‘growth’ forecasts.  
 
The Federal Reserve forecasts come from the Greenbook prepared by the staff of the Board of 
Governors before each meeting of the FOMC and are available from 1965:4 to 2001:4 for both 
inflation and real GDP/GNP growth at different horizons. They depend on the FOMC 
schedule and are then not available at a quarterly frequency. For instance, there were almost 
a meeting every month between 1960 and 1970 while eight forecasts in the 1980’s. For this 
work, the Federal Reserve forecasts of a quarter are the forecasts made in the second month 
of the quarter, which the date is the closest to the 15th day. Indeed, because the objective is to 
compare accuracy of the forecasts, Greenbook and SPF ones should correspond to the same 
level of information. Inflation and real GNP/GDP forecasts are the annualized quarterly 
growth rate. 
 
The commercial forecasts are those of SPF and are now conducted by the Federal Reserve 
Bank of Philadelphia itself. It extends the American Statistical Association/National Bureau 
of Economic Research Economic Outlook Survey. It is based on several commercial forecasts 
made by financial firms, banks, university research centers and private firms and is made in 
the second month of each quarter. Data are available without missing values from 1974:4 for 
inflation and from 1981:3 for real GDP. Here again forecasts are the annualized quarterly 
growth rates of the GNP/GDP price deflator and the real GNP/GDP. 
 
3.2 Real-Time versus Final Data 
The last series to present to make appropriate comparison of forecasts are the actual ones 
and these raise a particular issue. These kinds of data are frequently revised between the 
different releases and the question is then to know whether comparisons have to be made 
with the preliminary estimate, second estimate or final estimate. Because some information is 
not known directly or accounting standards change, the initial estimates are often revised.  
 
The issue here is to know whether we should consider the producing of forecasts as a beauty 
contest9 where forecasters try to obtain the most publicly-interesting results (the nearest 
forecasts to the first initial estimate) or whether we should compare to the definitive value 
(the one that economy experienced). Taking the real-time series could be defended on the 
basis that the influence of the forecast on the decisions is highest in the months following 
their release. At the opposite, choosing them on the purpose that forecasters cannot be 
                                                 
8 For more details on the data sets, see www.philadelphiafed.org/econ/forecast/index.cfm. 
9 I here use the ‘beauty contest’ term in the extent that it could be argued that forecasters attempt to forecast 
future earlier announcements of data rather than later revisions (see for instance Keane and Runkle (1990)).   8
expected to predict further revisions might lead to economic distortion in the sense that the 
final objective of a forecast is to consider the evolution of a variable really experienced by the 
economy and not its first and maybe incorrect estimate.  
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However and in order to check robustness of the analysis and assess what could be the 
impact of real-time data, calculus will be performed with both actual data. The corrected and 
final series is provided by the Bureau of Economic Analysis whereas initial estimates come 
from the Real-Time Data Set for Macroeconomists compiled by Croushore10 at the Federal 
Reserve Bank of Philadelphia. Both actual series are calculated as the forecasts, that is 
annualized quarterly growth rates. Figures 1 and 2 show the differences between the real-
time estimates and the final value respectively of inflation and real GDP and fuel arguments 
for the use of both types of data11 in regression. 
  
4. Some Different Methodologies 
 
In this section, the potential informational advantage is assessed through different methods 




The simplest method to compare the forecast accuracy of both institutions is to measure their 
Mean Square Errors. In order to calculate the p-value for the test of the null hypothesis that 
Federal Reserve’s and SPF’s MSE are equal, I estimate according to Romer and Romer (2000) 
the following regression: 
22
,, () ( )
GB SPF
th t h th t h t π ππ πα ε ++ −− − = +  
where α  is the difference between the squared errors of forecasts of both institutions and 
then allows to calculate the standard errors of α  corrected for serial correlation with the 
Newey-West HAC method12. I can thus obtain a robust p-value for the test of the null 
                                                 
10 For more details on the Real-Time Data Set, see Croushore and Stark (2001). Data are available on the website 
of the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia. 
11 The series which are already transformed into growth rates are stationary: the null hypothesis that each 
variable has a unit root is always rejected at the 10% level and most of the time at the 5% level. The investigation 
is carried out with the Phillips and Perron’s Test that proposes an alternative (nonparametric) method of 
controlling for serial correlation when testing for a unit root. These results are available upon request. 
12 In regressions as the ones used hereafter, the problem due to the correlation between forecast errors leads to 
calculate robust standard errors to serial correlation. Indeed, when forecasts for four quarters ahead miss an 
unexpected change in the variable, this would definitely cause forecasts errors all in the same direction. Forecasts 
are then declared serially correlated. In order to deal with this problem, when considering forecasts for inflation h 
quarters ahead, the standard errors are computed correcting for heteroskedasticity and serial correlation 
according to the Newey and West’s HAC Consistent Covariances method.   9
hypothesis that α = 0, in order to determine whether the forecast errors are significantly 
different. 
 
Table 1 shows the results. They are univocal concerning inflation forecasts: when both 
institutions are compared on the Final Data basis, Greenbook’s MSE are 0.93 and 1.51 
respectively at horizons h=1 and 4 while SPF’s MSE are 1.25 and 2.46. The p-values clearly 
prove that these values are significantly different. The pattern is identical and as 
straightforward when the comparison is made with Real-Time Data. 
About real GNP/GDP, results are much more mixed: the MSEs of Greenbook are 
comparable or a very little lower than those of SPF but the difference is not significant at all 
in the four cases (h=1 or 4 and with Final or Real-Time Data). 
 
These results confirm those of Gavin and Mandall (2000), where Greenbook’s inflation 
R M S E s  o u t p e r f o r m  F O M C  a n d  B l u e  C h i p ’ s  o n es, while for output, the RMSEs are very 
similar between all three forecasters. The pattern is the same in the Joutz and Stekler (2000) 
and  Sims’ (2002) findings. Clements, Joutz, Stekler (2004) only focus on Greenbook 
forecasts, but results for inflation and real GDP are equivalent. 
Moreover, these findings could be compared with those of Amornthurm (2006) that uses a 
near method to compare accuracy between two forecasts by evaluating the loss associated 
with forecasts errors. Diebold and Mariano (1995) propose a method to test the difference in 
the accuracy of two forecasts, that is applied by Amornthurm to the same data than here but 
at the individual level (Greenbook’s forecasts are compared to individual forecasts made for 
SPF but not to SPF’s consensus). The Diebold-Mariano test gives results that confirm the 
results here: the Fed has statistically lower MSE than 60-75% of the commercial forecasters 
and this proportion is even higher at 73% for forecasts at horizon four quarters ahead. The 
author adds than “clearly, no SPF forecaster can dominate the Fed at any horizon. A few may 
have lower MSE then the Fed’s one, but none of them has statistically lower MSE”. Finally, it 
can be said according to his work that the Fed dominates 60% of the commercial forecasters 
and is as accurate as 40% of them. 
 
4.2 Regressions 
In this section, the purpose is to compare the forecasts of the Federal Reserve with those of 
SPF with the regression methodology of Fair and Shiller (1989, 1990) and Romer and Romer 
(2000). It consists of regressing the actual inflation on forecasts made by both institutions in 
order to know whether the Greenbook’s forecasts contain information that could be useful to 
private agents to form their forecasts. The point as described by the authors is to see if 
“individuals who know the commercial forecasts could make better forecasts if they also 
knew the Federal Reserve’s”. 
The regression then follows this form:  
,,
GB SPF
th G B t h S P F t h t π αβ π βπ ε + =+ + + 
where  th π +  is the actual inflation, either the real-time or the final data,  ,
GB
th π  is the forecast 
made by the Federal Reserve and  ,
SPF
th π  by SPF in date t for h horizons later. The main idea 
behind this regression is then to see if Federal Reserve forecast contains useful information to 
forecast inflation and more useful information than the one given by SPF forecasts by testing 
whether  GB β  is different from zero, whether  GB β  is near to 1 and  GB β  is different and higher 
than  SPF β . Standard errors are here again computed using the Newey-West’s HAC 
methodology to correct serial correlation. 
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Robustness 
I then test the robustness of the main regression with a different specification concerning the 
timing of the Federal Reserve and SPF forecasts. In the first one, forecasts used come from 
the same quarter. Because the date when the forecasts are made in the quarter varies, the 
Federal Reserve may benefit of a possible timing advantage, because it has had more time to 
collect more data. Thus, this second specification put clearly the Federal Reserve in a 
deliberate situation of a timing disadvantage. The equation regressed becomes: 
1, 1 ,
GB SPF
th G B t h S P F t h t π αβ π βπ ε +− + =+ + + 
where  1, 1
GB
th π −+  is the forecast made by the Federal Reserve at the previous quarter compared 
to SPF, for a horizon one quarter later.  
 
Second, I re-run the main regression on a reduced sample to take into account the choice of 
Atkeson and Ohanian (2001) to rule out the period of strong disinflation of the beginning of 
the eighties. Due to the private agents’ idea that central bank won’t succeed to reduce 
inflation, central banks forecasts could have been better than private forecasts. In order not to 
debate on the date of the end of the disinflation, I exclude the Vockler mandate and start 
then the sample in 1987Q3 when Greenspan took his function. The end of the sample is still 
2001Q4. 
 
Third, in order to check that the estimates of previous regressions are not distorted by 
multicollinearity (Table 4 shows forecasts are highly correlated between themselves) as 




th G B o r S P F t h t π αβ π ε + =+ + 
The objective of this calculus is simply to compare the statistical tools of the global significant 
of the model (R² and Square Sum of Residuals) between the different forecasts, so as to 
ensure that the explanatory power found in the main regression is still valid when forecasts 
are compared one by one and not together and thus maybe polluted by the high correlation 
between them. It may be informative to have a look too on the coefficient GB or SPF β , more 
particularly in what extent this one is near to 1, and its significance. This calculation allows 
thus to check the robustness of the previous results at the hands of some critics against the 
method of regressions of forecasts combination.  
 
Results 
Table 2a summarizes the results of the main regression. Regarding inflation, this first 
regression shows first that the coefficients on the Greenbook forecasts are significant, while 
those of SPF are not at any time, and second that  GB β  is by and large near to one: 0.76 and 
0.99 at horizon h=1 respectively for Final and Real-Time Data and 1.38 and 1.21 at horizon 
h=4, while  SPF β  is next to zero. Concerning real GNP/GDP, the pattern is quite different: 
when analysing the base regression, at the short horizon h=1, both coefficients of Greenbook 
and SPF are very similar (grossly around 0.6) and significant only at the 10% level, for both 
actual data. At the longer horizon h=4, the coefficients of Greenbook  GB β  are higher than 0.5, 
but are not significant at all as those of SPF. Once again, it is very difficult to conclude 
something from the real GNP/GDP forecasts as the results are mixed. Both institutions seem 
to be on an equal footing about real activity forecasts. In comparison, the inflation results let 
appear some evidence for a better accuracy of the Fed forecasts. 
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Table 2b exhibits the regression results with a timing disadvantage for the Federal Reserve 
and those about inflation present almost similar results: except when compared to final data 
at short horizon (h=1), where the estimate of SPF β  is superior to the one of  GB β , respectively 
0.59 and 0.48 (but both are significant), the coefficients of the Greenbook are significant while 
those of SPF not, are always largely superior to those of the SPF, and are included between 
0.71 and 0.97, so significantly near to one. 
One can note that the informational advantage shown by these coefficients seems to be 
higher when the horizons are longer, this being robust to both types of actual data. 
In the regression concerning real GNP/GDP, at horizon h=1, the results are straight: 
estimates of  GB β  are near to zero and not significant at all while those of  SPF β  are near to one 
and very significant. At the longer horizon h=4, neither estimates of coefficients of both 
forecasters give any indication and are not significant (even at the 10% level). 
 
Table 2c reveals the coefficients of the regression made on a smaller sample in order to rule 
out the strong disinflation period and thus assess the previous results at the light of more 
economically stable period. The numerical results are in the line with the other specifications: 
significance of the Greenbook estimates at both horizons (while not for the SPF) and 
coefficients near to one, in the inflation case. Here again, the real GNP/GDP case do not give 
analyzable results, those being conflicting and not significant. 
 
Table 2d compiles indicators that could help to verify that estimates of regressions are not 
polluted by strong correlation between forecasts, by confirming the difference in the 
explanatory power of each forecast. Thus, regarding to inflation, one can observe that the R² 
is consistently higher and the SSR consistently lower for the Greenbook forecasts compared 
to the SPF ones, the gap rising when the horizon is longer, whatever actual data are. These 
corroborate previous results showing that the Federal Reserve make better inflation forecasts 
than SPF. The results concerning the real GNP/GDP do not give further indications about a 
potential informational advantage. The very similar R² and SSR confirm that both 
institutions are on an equal footing and have a very proximate forecast accuracy (or 
inaccuracy) and seem then to benefit from the same information. 
 
The results of the base regression (confirmed by the robustness regressions) are similar to 
those of Sims (2002) where the coefficient on Greenbook inflation forecasts is consistently 
higher than those of SPF or MPS, while Greenbook output forecasts has not this advantage 
over the private forecasts. They extend too the results of Romer and Romer (2000) for 
inflation but are slightly different concerning real GNP/GDP for which they conclude that 
Fed has an informational advantage and that this one is even more pronounced than 
inflation at short horizon. 
Here again these inflation results can be compared with those of Amornthum (2006) at the 
individual level based on the forecast encompassing test of Harvey, Leybourne and 
Newbold (1998). It consists of regressing the forecast errors of one forecaster on the 
difference between Fed and commercial forecasts and inversely with Fed and assess then 
who can explain the errors of the other. He finds that proportions of SPF forecasters who are 
encompassed by the Fed are approximately between 50% and 90%. They do not find 
evidence that the SPF forecasters can encompass the Fed. 
 
4.3 A Pooled Approach 
The fourth method used to discriminate forecasts of inflation and output made by the 
Federal Reserve and the private forecasters is based on a Davies and Lahiri (1995) and 
Clements, Joutz and Stekler (2007) methodology that consists of pooling the forecasts across   12
all horizons. Many of the others studies on the subject compared the forecasts separately for 
each horizon and using this methodology permits to diversify ways to obtain results and 
thus affirm the robustness of conclusions. 
The advantage of this approach concerns the interpretation of findings, not subject to each 
individual horizon as when for instance results are opposed for different horizons of 
forecasts. 
Some issues arise with this method: is it adequate to pool the forecast obtained by different 
models, supposing that maybe forecasts at short and long horizons are not derived from the 
same models, and in the same manner to pool survey’s consensus that represents many 
individual forecasters? The decomposition of forecast errors developed by Davies and Lahiri 
(1995), used by Clements, Joutz and Stekler (2007) and repeated here responds specifically 
to these concerns. 
The method needs because of aggregating the horizons to deduct the correlation structure 
across errors of targets and lengths that is consistent with rationality. The forecast error can 
be presented as follows: 
tt h t ht h AF α λε − =+ +  
where  t A  is the effective value at t,  th F  is the forecast made for the period t at time t-h, that is 
with a horizon of h periods,  th λ  are the aggregate or common macroeconomic shocks and 
correspond to the sum of all shocks that occurred between t-h  and  t, and  th ε are the 
idiosyncratic shocks. 
This equation can be rewritten:                  th th ev α = +  
And then for all observations:     TH α = + ei v    (1)  
where v is the TH vector that aggregate  th v according to A and F. One may assume that E (v) 
= 0, but  () E = Σ vv'  will not be proportional to the identity matrix. Assuming that the  th ε  are 
not correlated, 
2 () th sj E ε ε εσ =  when s=t and j=h, and zero otherwise, we obtain:  
2
TH ε σ = + Σ I Ψ 
Ψcaptures the fact that forecasts which have common macroeconomic shocks, whatever the 
targets are, will be correlated. The precise form13 of Ψ depends on the maximum and 
minimum forecast lengths, but principally on the single unknown variance parameter 
22 () ut Eu σ =  supposing homoscedastic aggregate shocks. One may also assume the 
idiosyncratic shocks have common variance, 
22 () th E ε σ ε = , for all t and h. 










= ∑∑     (2) 
To obtain a consistent standard error for OLS, Σ needs to be replaced by an estimate  ˆ Σ. To 
calculate it, one have to required estimates of 
2
u σ  and 
2
ε σ . These can be obtained as follows. 
ˆ α  is estimated from (2). Then  ˆ ˆth th ve α = − . Using 
222 () th u E vh ε σ σ =+ , one may obtain 
estimates 
2 ˆu σ and 
2 ˆε σ  as the estimated coefficients  0 ˆ ϕ  and  1 ˆ ϕ  in the regression:  
01 ˆˆ vv i τ TH ϕ ϕω = ++ D  
where D is the Hadamard product, denoting element-by-element multiplication, τ i τ TH =⊗  
(⊗ is the Kronecker product, defining block multiplication) and  ( , 1,...,1) τH HH ′ = − . Thus, 
                                                 
13 See Clements, Joutz and Stekler (2007) for more details.   13
0 ˆ ϕ  is an estimate of 
2
ε σ , the variance of idiosyncratic shocks and  1 ˆ ϕ  estimates 
2
u σ , the 
variance of the homoscedastic macro shocks. 
The possibility of private information is noted by Davies and Lahiri (1995), their original 
formulation becoming:  




th tj j u λ
= =∑  and 
1
h
th tj j η ε
= =∑ . Thus, as h  gets smaller the variance of the private 
component,  () th Var η  declines. Without private information, the variance of the private 
component is constant for all h. 
In this analysis, we can think of the Federal Reserve or SPF as possessing confidential private 
information. Whether the Federal Reserve or SPF has private information, so that the 
idiosyncratic component is absent  2
ε σ = 0 and  2
u σ  the macro shock becomes the global 
variance of 
*
tj u , or whether there is an idiosyncratic component, will influence the correlation 
structures of the forecast errors and the validity of some tests of the efficiency forecasts. 
These alternative assumptions about private information could provide some robustness to 
the results. 
The added value of this methodology is to bring strength to previous results and 
check if they are not sensitive to the fact that analysis is made horizon by horizon. The 
method of pooling forecasts leads to more global and in-one-way results about the 
performance of both institutions by and large.  
 
For the estimation presented here, forecasts of current and next four quarters of both 
institutions are pooled. Table 3 indeed confirms the previous results for both inflation and 
real GNP/GDP. For the former, the SPF bias is larger than the Greenbook one and more 
significant, whether the data are final or real-time and the assumption on private 
information stated or not. Similarly, the pooled Greenbook RMSE are again lower than those 
of SPF. For the latter, values of bias are very close between themselves and the RMSE are 
almost equal, what tends to confirm too that concerning the real GNP/GDP the Federal 
Reserve is not a better forecaster than private sector and do not dispose of private 
information on this variable. 
 
4.4 One Factor Model 
The choice of this last method comes from the observation that forecasts are highly 
correlated and even more strongly correlated between themselves14 than with the actual 
data, as one can see from Table 4. 
The choice of factor analysis as an other method to assess informational advantage uprises 
from the work of Romer and Romer (2000) when they regress actual inflation on the 
forecasts, who refer to this method as measuring the ‘information content’ of forecasts, in the 
sense that they provide information to people who would like to approach the actual value 
of inflation. But as Sims (2002) objects, “while this regression is useful information, if 
interpreted carefully, it is probably misleading to think of it as characterizing ‘information 
content’. These forecasts in some sense have nearly the same ‘content’, since they are so 
highly correlated”. 
In order to provide a more complete study on information asymmetry, this part will now 
replicate the method thought by Sims to attempt to rule out the high correlation between 
forecasts thanks to factor analysis. This method is near to the Principal Components Analysis 
insofar as it searches to replace a large set of variables with a smaller set of new variables, 
                                                 
14 This could mainly be explained by the herding phenomena that characterizes the financial markets and their 
actors (Shiller (1995) and Devenow and Welch (1996)).   14
but takes it away to find a solution to the covariance between observed variable. It is used as 
an explanatory model for the correlations among data and attempts to explain the variance 
which is common to at least two variables and presume that each variable have also an own 
variance which represents its own contribution. 
The main assumption is that all forecasters have imperfect observations on a single 
‘forecastable component’ (the common factor that gathers the strong covariance between 
forecasts) of actual value, which they may or may not use optimally. If f* is the forecastable 
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with Ω diagonal and
*
th f  orthogonal to ε  and ν . 
In this model, the quality of a forecast is related inversely to the variance of its th ε  and to the 
deviation of its θ  coefficients fromβ . It could be noted that the coefficients are not 
proportional to the forecast error variances, because they maybe include a dominant 
contribution from the variance of ν ; the coefficients are inversely proportional to the relative 
idiosyncratic variances, even if these are an unimportant component of overall forecast error. 
Sims proposes and presents the possibility of a second component of common variation: a 
‘common error’, but argues that analysis of forecast quality would then be limited and that 
despite its simplicity the model above provides “a good approximation to the actual 
properties of the forecasts”. This method could indeed allow discriminating between the part 
of forecast errors which arise from unforecastable macroeconomic shocks and the part which 
comes from idiosyncratic errors. 
Thus, the objective is to gather the correlation between forecasts in a ‘forecastable 
component’ in order to extract specific variances proper to each forecast. Thus the 
variance
2 σ of  th ε  is our point of interest. However, considering the factor analysis 
methodology, the interpretation of the estimates could be difficult in general, but even more 
in this fit because a simple model with only one factor (as decided here to deal with the 
correlation issue) is obviously not sufficient to explain the pattern in these data. An analysis 
with multiple factors as widely used in sociology would give better statistical results. 
Thereby, the likelihood ratio and the p-value of acceptable fit are likely to be low because of 
the deliberate choice of only one factor as an base hypothesis and due to the fact that this 
method provides results that are sensitive to serial correlation and non-normality, two 
characteristics of forecasts. 
 
Table 5 presents the results. The model based on the hypothesis of a common and unique 
forecastable component ascribes a very low idiosyncratic error to Greenbook forecasts 
compared to naïve15 and SPF forecasts. While at a short horizon h=1, the difference is not so 
marked (as in the Sims’ paper), the difference at horizon h=4 is clear, this being right for both 
inflation and real GNP/GDP and both actual data. These results suggest that the forecast 
accuracy of Greenbook forecasts arises from their low idiosyncratic error.  
One could nevertheless be surprised that the specific error is so low for real GNP/GDP, as 
the Greenbook do not seem to better perform than SPF in previous results. One possible 
explanation might be that the Fed makes good forecasts of the ‘forecastable component’ (the 
                                                 
15 The naïve forecast series is added in order to get a benchmark in the one factor model. This series corresponds 
to no-change forecasts, i.e. the value at the date t is the forecast at the date t+1.    15
Greenbook estimates of f* are close to 1…), while SPF makes less precise forecast of this 
component (…and much lower for the SPF). But the better forecast accuracy of a component 
that will surely be subject to macro shocks and whose determinants are more difficult to 
evaluate might not give a clear advantage and SPF with a higher idiosyncratic error arrives 
thus at a similar forecast performance.  
 
These results are similar to those of Sims (2002) with in particularly a low idiosyncratic error 
for the Greenbook forecasts. He concludes as here that Greenbook has superior information 
concerning inflation, but that there is no advantage in favor of the one or the other institution 
about output which is line with the results of the previous methodologies of this paper. 
 
4.5 Robustness Test: Alternative Inflation Variable 
Private agents may be more prone to forecast the Consumer Price Index (CPI) than the GDP 
price deflator, and this might be a reason for their less accurate performance in forecasting 
inflation. In order to check the robustness of the previous results for inflation, I then provide 
additional tests with CPI. Data are available from the same sources, but only from 1982Q1 to 
2001Q4.  Table 6 displays evidence that confirms the previous results and show that the 
variable chosen for inflation do not lead to reconsider the accuracy of Greenbook’s forecasts. 
 
5. Analysis of the Informational Advantage 
 
5.1 Two Main Results 
Two robust conclusions emerge from the comprehensive set of methodologies used to assess 
the forecasts accuracy and then the information asymmetry. Indeed, the switch to one actual 
data to the other and the similarity of the results independently of the specifications suggest: 
First, Fed possesses an informational advantage on inflation but only on it. There is 
no evidence of any advantage for private forecasters or Fed on real GNP/GDP. 
Second, the longer the horizon, the more pronounced the advantage of Fed on 
inflation. This tends to confirm the advantage is robust and not due to timing advantage and 
access to information on the short run. 
 
The possible explanations for an advantage of the Fed on inflation and not output are not 
obvious. It might be advanced that inflation variable is on what central banks are first (but 
not only) judged. All the more so inflation forecasts are often considered as the intermediate 
target of monetary policy. Moreover, the lost associated to inflation in the central bank loss 
function may have some impact too. If Fed greatly balances inflation, Fed will make 
everything possible to reach its inflation goal and then endogenises inflation by dint of 
focusing on it. Thus the second variable, the output growth, becomes an adjustment variable. 
This focus may be all the more so important that Fed attempt to reach its ‘implicit’ inflation 
target. Finally, the vision of central banking as management of expectations may strengthen 
the argument for an inflation focus.  
 
Compared to the previous literature, the first result confirms the view of Sims (2002), but are 
in partial contrast with those of Romer and Romer (2000), since there is no evidence of a 
Fed’s advantage on GDP and totally opposed to Atkeson and Ohanian (2001) and Joutz and 
Stekler (2000) that find no advantage. The second pattern highlighted here contributes to the 
literature as a new outcome. 
 
The advantage of Fed on inflation is all the more so notable that Stock and Watson (2007) 
show inflation has both become easier to forecast, due to the decline of its volatility, but also   16
harder to forecast insofar as “it has become much more difficult for an inflation forecaster to 
provide value added beyond a univariate model”. On the other hand, the equivalence of 
forecasts accuracy of growth could bridge with Tulip (2005) which finds uncertainty is still 
as high as in 1970s at long horizons and has been less reduced than volatility. It may explain 
in part that errors are quite similar.  Last, the finding that Fed and private forecasters makes 
similar errors on growth is confirmed by Baghestani (2008) that finds unemployment rate 
forecasts (as a proxy of real activity) are very similar between Fed and private forecasters.  
 
5.2 A Parallel Result: the Actual Data Issue 
Whatever inflation data are real-time or final, the results give similar indications on the 
Federal Reserve’s informational advantage, what constitute a robustness check and tend to 
support the conclusion that patterns of forecast accuracy presented here are not subject to 
variation of data definitions.  
 
Furthermore, an identical scheme emerges from all methodologies: Fed and SPF better 
forecast real-time value of real GDP while they both have more accurate predictions of final 
data of inflation.  
One possible explanation of this pattern is that real GDP is certainly more difficult to forecast 
than inflation, its determinants more multiple and subjects to fewer vagaries, while inflation 
could suffer from more cyclical events, but is better anchored. Thus, when forecasting real 
GDP, forecasters are quite understandably targeting the nearest (the more current) actual 
data. 
 
5.3 Sources of the Fed’s Advantage 
In the literature, the sources of an informational advantage of the central bank may arise 
from different arguments: (i) the institutional and inherent advantage possessed by the 
central bank about its own future policy path, (ii) the knowledge derived from the role of 
supervisor and regulator of banks (Peek, Rosengren and Tootell (1998) and (2003)), (iii) an 
expertise advantage leading Sims (2002) to argue that “the Fed is simply making better use 
than other forecasters of the same collection of aggregate time series available to all”, (iv) the 
fact that as reported by Romer and Romer (2000) the Fed succeeds in collecting better and 
larger detailed information about determinants of future inflation, what is somehow linked 
to specific expertise. It stems from the huge amount of resources it devotes to this fastidious 
work, relative to individual private-sector firms or banks, and (v) secrecy, that provides to 
the Fed a relative enhanced information set compared to private forecasters. 
 
When taken into account that developed networks allow information to circulate very 
quickly, that private sector as a whole employs highly qualified forecasters and dedicates 
significant amounts to forecasting, and hypothesis that the financial markets properly 
aggregate information, arguments (iii) and (iv) about specific expertise might seem 
questionable. However, two points temper this judgment: first, although huge progresses 
have been made in the information process recently, coordination, uncertainty and noisy 
signals are still rendering information imperfect as the thriving literature on those subjects 
attests; second, Bernanke and Boivin (2003)16 develop a data-rich environment model that 
                                                 
16 Their analysis besides compare the forecasting performance of the Greenbook to their data-rich model: FM-
VAR and to combination of the Greenbook and their model. They find Greenbook does marginally worse than 
FM-VAR for next quarter’s inflation (CPI here) forecast and better for longer horizons, while unemployment 
forecasts are comparable. These outcomes appear to be in line with those found here. The combination forecasts 
have broadly similar (verily better) forecasting performance than Greenbook forecasts.   17
confirms aggregation and exploitation of a very large amount of data has an added-value for 
monetary policy analysis. 
Concerning the argument (ii), Peek, Rosengren and Tootell (1998, 2003) suggest the Fed 
obtains its exploitable informational advantage from its supervisory role and more 
specifically from non market traded banks, for which the data are confidential and remain so 
for a significant period of time. These works could be put together with the ones of Kashyap 
and Stein (1994a, 1994b, 2000) that find small banks may be particularly important for the 
level of economic activity because they disproportionately lend to finance inventories and 
small business. Thus, all information that could be gathered from this side is ‘unavailable’ to 
private sector and seems useful and used by the Fed via its supervisory role.  
 
Concerning the advance knowledge of Fed’s future policy path, evidence is mixed. Some 
empirical investigation17 on market expectations of the federal funds rate shows that US 
markets are rarely surprised by the Fed at very short horizons as a few weeks. For longer 
horizon, the performance of expectations is poorest, what corroborate argument (i). 
However, Hubert (2009) assesses potential informational advantage of some communicating 
central banks and finds that if it may constitute private information, it is not a sufficient 
condition. Moreover, the Swedish central bank publishes explicit interest rate paths and yet 
experiences a significant informational advantage. Last, interest rate paths result from 
macroeconomic forecasts and are in fact endogenous to the specific expertise of the central 
bank. 
 
Finally, argument (v) on secrecy is also countered by results of Hubert (2009) on 
communicating central banks. The Fed appears then to benefit from a specific expertise 
advantage and from its institutional access to special information. The effects of advance 
knowledge of future policy path, due to the structure of the monetary game where the 




This paper assesses information asymmetry between the central bank and the private sector 
by comparing forecasting performance of the Fed and the Survey of Professional Forecasters.  
In order to gain some unambiguous results, since empirical evidence is mixed so far, the 
objective of this work is to avoid biases of methods, data and samples when assessing this 
issue. The results are twofold: first, Fed possesses an informational advantage on inflation 
but only on it. There is no evidence of any advantage for private forecasters or Fed on real 
GNP/GDP. Second, the longer the horizon, the more pronounced the advantage of Fed on 
inflation. This tends to confirm the advantage is robust and not due to timing advantage and 
access to information on the short run. 
 
When analyzing these results, one should nevertheless keep in mind that they are tributary 
to the fact that forecasts and surveys are respectively not perfect proxy for information and 
for private sector information. Even so, an open question arises from these results: 
practically, how the Fed could take benefit from this advantage on private agents’ 
expectations to conduct its monetary policy.  
                                                 
17 See for instance on this topic Poole, Rasche, and Thornton (2002) and Swanson (2006).   18
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Horizon GB SPF p-value Horizon GB SPF p-value
1 0.9301 1.2508 0.0208 1 1.1964 1.7160 0.0006
4 1.5172 2.4671 0.0001 4 1.7372 2.5755 0.00003
Horizon GB SPF p-value Horizon GB SPF p-value
1 6.0972 6.2341 0.7446 1 4.6124 4.6185 0.9855
4 6.2479 6.5188 0.5400 4 4.7267 4.8507 0.7401
The p-value is for the test of the null hypothesis that the central bank errors and private sector errors are equal.
Table 1 - Mean Squared Errors
Inflation - Final Inflation - Real Time





Coef Std Error Coef Std Error
Cst -0.5224** (0.2593) Cst -0.2827 (0.2781)
GB+1 0.7650*** (0.1211) GB+1 0.9931*** (0.1206)
SPF+1 0.2847* (0.1514) SPF+1 -0.0032 (0.1663)
Coef Std Error Coef Std Error
Cst -0.1855 (0.4520) Cst -0.3846 (0.4437)
GB+4 1.3851*** (0.2228) GB+4 1.2176*** (0.2360)
SPF+4 -0.3781 (0.2434) SPF+4 -0.1783 (0.2247)
Coef Std Error Coef Std Error
Cst -0.3840 (0.8778) Cst -0.2863 (0.8996)
GB+1 0.7277* (0.3701) GB+1 0.5313* (0.2976)
SPF+1 0.6422** (0.3017) SPF+1 0.6250* (0.3672)
Coef Std Error Coef Std Error
Cst 2.7710* (1.6030) Cst 1.8915 (1.4741)
GB+4 0.7407 (0.5537) GB+4 0.5483 (0.4455)
SPF+4 -0.5286 (0.5794) SPF+4 -0.1878 (0.4457)
Numbers in parentheses are robust standard errors. *,**,*** means respectively significant at 10%, 5% and 1%.
Real GNP/GDP - Final Data Real GNP/GDP - Real-Time Data
Real GNP/GDP - Final Data Real GNP/GDP - Real-Time Data
Table 2a - Base Regression
Inflation - Final Data Inflation - Real-Time Data
Inflation - Final Data Inflation - Real-Time Data
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Coef Std Error Coef Std Error
Cst -0.6614** (0.2651) Cst -0.4570 (0.2956)
GB+2 0.4805*** (0.1714) GB+2 0.7161*** (0.2072)
SPF+1 0.5975*** (0.1969) SPF+1 0.3121 (0.2323)
Coef Std Error Coef Std Error
Cst -0.5284 (0.4824) Cst -0.7914 (0.5117)
GB+5 0.9727*** (0.2859) GB+5 0.9247*** (0.2417)
SPF+4 0.0655 (0.2833) SPF+4 0.1802 (0.2876)
Coef Std Error Coef Std Error
Cst -0.4633 (1.1861) Cst -0.0887 (1.0243)
GB+2 0.0719 (0.3882) GB+2 -0.1880 (0.3083)
SPF+1 1.3057*** (0.3414) SPF+1 1.2545*** (0.3773)
Coef Std Error Coef Std Error
Cst 3.2392* (1.7349) Cst 2.2244 (1.5707)
GB+5 0.8660 (0.6184) GB+5 0.2689 (0.4746)
SPF+4 -0.8467 (0.7725) SPF+4 -0.0685 (0.6585)
Numbers in parentheses are robust standard errors. *,**,*** means respectively significant at 10%, 5% and 1%.
*only 90 obs, because GB don't always publish forecasts at horizon h=5
Real GNP/GDP - Final Data Real GNP/GDP - Real-Time Data
Real GNP/GDP - Final Data* Real GNP/GDP - Real-Time Data*
Table 2b - Timing Disadvantage
Inflation - Final Data Inflation - Real-Time Data
Inflation - Final Data* Inflation - Real-Time Data*  23
Coef Std Error Coef Std Error
Cst -0.0486 (0.3781) Cst -0.5337 (0.4333)
GB+1 0.5331*** (0.1975) GB+1 0.8314*** (0.2058)
SPF+1 0.3457 (0.2084) SPF+1 0.2149 (0.1932)
Coef Std Error Coef Std Error
Cst 0.2288 (0.5540) Cst -0.4836 (0.6528)
GB+4 0.8041** (0.3952) GB+4 0.9451*** (0.3463)
SPF+4 -0.0152 (0.4505) SPF+4 0.0858 (0.4307)
Coef Std Error Coef Std Error
Cst 0.8770 (1.0720) Cst 0.4403 (1.1918)
GB+1 0.3724 (0.3440) GB+1 0.1499 (0.2253)
SPF+1 0.5371 (0.3905) SPF+1 0.7942* (0.4628)
Coef Std Error Coef Std Error
Cst 5.5045*** (1.3727) Cst 3.3406** (1.3550)
GB+4 0.4235 (0.6567) GB+4 0.1679 (0.5685)
SPF+4 -1.4397* (0.7264) SPF+4 -0.4479 (0.6789)
Numbers in parentheses are robust standard errors. *,**,*** means respectively significant at 10%, 5% and 1%.
Real GNP/GDP - Final Data Real GNP/GDP - Real-Time Data
Inflation - Final Data Inflation - Real-Time Data
Real GNP/GDP - Final Data Real GNP/GDP - Real-Time Data
Table 2c - Smaller Sample Period 1987Q3-2001Q4 - 58 obs
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Coef Std Err Coef Std Err
1.0193*** (0.0502) 0.9902*** (0.0583)
R² 0.8711 R² 0.8323
Adjusted R² 0.8699 Adjusted R² 0.8307
SSR 92.4313 SSR 118.7663
1.0711*** (0.0637) 1.0177*** (0.0809)
R² 0.8360 R² 0.7642
Adjusted R² 0.8345 Adjusted R² 0.7620
SSR 117.5840 SSR 166.9585
1.0605*** (0.1153) 1.0646*** (0.1218)
R² 0.7712 R² 0.7470
Adjusted R² 0.7691 Adjusted R² 0.7447
SSR 155.4973 SSR 178.9005
1.0953*** (0.1674) 1.1170*** (0.1581)
R² 0.6636 R² 0.6634
Adjusted R² 0.6605 Adjusted R² 0.6603
SSR 228.6615 SSR 238.0248
Coef Std Err Coef Std Err
1.1469*** (0.3057) 0.9393*** (0.2604)
R² 0.2548 R² 0.2220
Adjusted R² 0.2455 Adjusted R² 0.2123
SSR 467.3179 SSR 375.6818
1.3490*** (0.3360) 1.1411*** (0.3194)
R² 0.2370 R² 0.2202
Adjusted R² 0.2274 Adjusted R² 0.2104
SSR 478.5308 SSR 376.5563
0.4887 (0.5113) 0.4587 (0.4469)
R² 0.0294 R² 0.0325
Adjusted R² 0.0172 Adjusted R² 0.0204
SSR 464.3463 SSR 368.0784
0.0796 (0.6513) 0.2624 (0.5686)
R² 0.0005 R² 0.0062
Adjusted R² -0.0120 Adjusted R² -0.0062
SSR 478.1735 SSR 378.1018










Table 2d - Significant Model
Inflation - Final Data - 1974:4-2001:4 Inflation - Real Time Data - 1974:4-2001:4
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se   p-val se   p-val RMSFE
GB -0.279 0.128 0.029 0.166 0.093 0.527 0.181 1.071
SPF -0.476 0.170 0.005 0.196 0.016 0.456 0.330 1.293
GB -0.268 0.134 0.046 0.181 0.138 0.691 0.197 1.164
SPF -0.465 0.160 0.004 0.206 0.024 0.802 0.284 1.367
GB 0.743 0.273 0.007 0.418 0.076 3.532 0.579 2.413
SPF 0.695 0.292 0.018 0.423 0.101 3.304 0.676 2.411
GB 0.214 0.280 0.446 0.376 0.571 2.227 0.642 2.049






Idiosyncratic No  Idiosyncratic













Actual GB SPF Actual GB SPF
Actual 1 Actual 1
GB 0.9333 1 GB 0.9123 1
SPF 0.9143 0.9585 1 SPF 0.8742 0.9585 1
Actual GB SPF Actual GB SPF
Actual 1 Actual 1
GB 0.8782 1 GB 0.8643 1
SPF 0.8146 0.9555 1 SPF 0.8145 0.9555 1
Actual GB SPF Actual GB SPF
Actual 1 Actual 1
GB 0.5048 1 GB 0.4712 1
SPF 0.4868 0.7964 1 SPF 0.4692 0.7964 1
Actual GB SPF Actual GB SPF
Actual 1 Actual 1
GB 0.1713 1 GB 0.1803 1
SPF 0.0213 0.6257 1 SPF 0.0786 0.6257 1
Table 4 - Correlation
Real GNP/GDP +1 - Final Data Real GNP/GDP +1 - Real-Time Data
Real GNP/GDP +4 - Final Data Real GNP/GDP +4 - Real-Time Data
Inflation +1 - Final Data Inflation +1 - Real-Time Data
Inflation +4 - Final Data Inflation +4  - Real-Time Data
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est var est var est var est var
Actual 0.945 0.108 0.881 0.224 0.9179 0.1574 0.8682 0.246
GB 0.982 0.036 0.998 0.005 0.9859 0.028 0.9967 0.007
SPF 0.976 0.047 0.957 0.084 0.9717 0.0559 0.9579 0.082
Naïve 0.934 0.128 0.894 0.201 0.9037 0.1833 0.8828 0.221
log LH -0.048 log LH -0.291 log LH -0.116 log LH -0.179
p-value 0.079 p-value 0.000 p-value 0.002 p-value 0.000
est var est var est var est var
Actual 0.5672 0.6783 0.1716 0.9705 0.5537 0.6934 0.1812 0.9672
GB 0.8816 0.2228 0.9975 0.005 0.8908 0.2065 0.9975 0.005
SPF 0.8988 0.1921 0.6271 0.6068 0.8849 0.217 0.6271 0.6068
Naïve 0.582 0.6613 0.1615 0.9739 0.6058 0.633 0.2925 0.9145
log LH -0.033 log LH -0.197 log LH -0.094 log LH -0.174
p-value 0.277 p-value 0.000 p-value 0.026 p-value 0.001
Table 5 - One Factor Model 
Inflation - Real-Time Data Inflation - Final Data
Real GNP/GDP - Final Data Real GNP/GDP - Real-Time Data
Horizon h=1 Horizon h=4 Horizon h=1 Horizon h=4




Horizon GB SPF p-value
1 4.510 4.770 0.1853
4 4.137 4.498 0.0053
Coef Std Error Coef Std Error
Cst 0.8551 (0.8194) Cst 1.2706 (0.8189)
GB+1 1.0658* 0.6445 GB+4 1.1088** 0.4686
SPF+1 -0.3907 0.7745 SPF+4 -0.5528 0.5333
Coef Std Error Coef Std Error
Cst 1.4887 (1.0333) Cst 1.2262 (0.9912)
GB+2 1.1308*** 0.2607 GB+5 1.2748* 0.7468
SPF+1 -0.6720 0.5215 SPF+4 -0.7104 0.8274
Coef Std Error Coef Std Error
0.7748*** (0.1929) 0.7391*** (0.2606)
R² 0.1511 R² 0.0966
Adj. R² 0.1402 Adj. R² 0.0850
SSR 349.0 SSR 371.4
Coef Std Error Coef Std Error
0.6426*** (0.1914) 0.5958*** (0.2241)
R² 0.1138 R² 0.0796
Adj. R² 0.1025 Adj. R² 0.0678
SSR 304.1 SSR 315.8
*,**,*** means respectively significant at 10%, 5% and 1%.
Table 6 - Robustness: CPI (1982:1 - 2001:4)
Base
Regressions
Mean Square Errors
GB+4
GB+1
Significant Model
Timing Disadvantage
SPF+1
SPF+4
 